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PARTIES
All of the parties to this appeal are listed in the
caption.

JURISDICTION

This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n pursuarit t o A r t i c l e VIII,
Section 3 of t h e Constitution of Utah and Utiah Code Ann,
§ 78-2-(3)(b)

(1987, as amended).
C0UNTER-8TATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I.

Did the t r i a l court properly conclude t h a t the value
of property in a condemnation action was enhanced by
i t s proximity t o an a i r p o r t constructed following a
separate condemnation proceeding eleven years
e a r l i e r . This issue i s subject t o review under the
" c l e a r l y erroneous" standard of Utjah R. Civ. P.
52(a). x

II.

Did the t r i a l court properly admit^ i n t o evidence the
a p p r a i s a l of J . P h i l i p Cook and finding t h a t t h i s
a p p r a i s a l provided the best estimate of the value of
the condemned property.
This issiie i s reviewable for
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . 2

Whether a condemnee is e n t i t l e d to recover the value of his property as
enhanced by a p r i o r condemnation and development of adjacent property
depends on whether the second taking is within jthe scope of the
original government project. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,
376-77 (1943). Whether the second taking is within the scope of the
o r i g i n a l project presents a question of fact. Mobile Co. v. Brantly,
507 So. 2d 483, 486 (Ala. 1987). Questions of fact are subject to
review under the "clearly erroneous" standard, Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a),
and must remain undisturbed unless "the reviewing court on the e n t i r e
evidence i s l e f t with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemmer, 470 U.S. 564, 573
(1985) (quoting, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948)); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s rulings regarding the admissibility and weight of J.
Philip Cook's expert opinion are reviewable orjly for an abuse of
d i s c r e t i o n . Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Utah
1984). Under t h i s standard, a reviewing court will not upset the
judgment of the t r i a l court unless the t r i a l court "acted in excess of
i t s authority or in a manner so c l e a r l y outside reason that i t s action
must be deemed capricious and a r b i t r a r y . " Pe^tross v. Board of
Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976).
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III.

Whether the t r i a l court erred in using an option
agreement t o determine the cost of acquiring needed
access t o the condemned
property. This i s s u e i s
reviewable de novo.2,

IV.

Whether the t r i a l court erroneously refused t o award
a t t o r n e y ' s fees and a p p r a i s a l c o s t s based on the bad
f a i t h conduct of the P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t . While the
award of a t t o r n e y ' s fees i s generally reviewable only
for abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , t h i s issue a l s o p r e s e n t s a
question of s 4t a t u t o r y construction reviewable de novo
by the Court.
STATUTE8 INVOLVED

The t e x t of the Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 57-12-1 e t seq. (1987, as amended), i s attached as
Addendum A t o t h i s b r i e f .
The t e x t of the Federal Uniform Real Property
Acquisition Policy, 42 U.S.C. § 4651 e t seq. (1989), i s
attached as Addendum B.

Because an option agreement i s inadmissible evidence of market value as
a matter of law, United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir.
1966), the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n to use an option agreement to
determine the value of adjoining land needed to access the condemned
property i s reviewable for l e g a l error.
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n to refuse an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and
appraisal c o s t s based on the condemnor's bad f a i t h conduct i s
reviewable for an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . Canyon Country Store v.
Bracey,
781 P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1989). However, included in the t r i a l c o u r t ' s
d e c i s i o n to refuse an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and appraisal c o s t s i s
i t s conclusion that the Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-12-1 e t seq. (1987, as amended), and the Federal Uniform Real
Property A c q u i s i t i o n P o l i c i e s , 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 4651-55 (Law. Co-op.
1989), do not apply to t h i s c a s e . This presents a question of
s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . As the ultimate authority responsible for
i n t e r p r e t i n g l e g i s l a t i v e enactments, t h i s Court a p p l i e s a "correction
of error" or de novo standard of review to questions of s t a t u t o r y
c o n s t r u c t i o n . Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791
P.2d 511, 513 (Utah 1990).
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987, as amended),
provides in relevant part:
In civil actions, the court shall ^ward
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the
action or defense to the action wa^ without
merit and not brought or asserted i[n good
faith. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant Board of County Commissioners of

Tooele County (the "County") filed this condemnation action
against Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant Joseph Wiley
Ferrebee as trustee of the Ferrebee 1976 Family Trust
("Ferrebee") on May 16, 1986. Record (hereinafter "R.")

6.

The County sought to condemn 43.66 acres of Ferrebee's
property (the "subject property") in order to expand the
Tooele County Airport from its original siie when completed in
1976.

After filing its complaint, the County received an

order of immediate occupancy and the propeirty was transferred

I
to the county to begin construction.

R. 2D.

At trial the parties contested thje valuation of the
condemned property and each put on expert evidence of the
property's value.

Ferrebee also presente4 evidence of the

County's non-compliance with the procedural requirements
mandated by the Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code Ann.
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§ 57-12-1 et seq. (1987, as amended) (Addendum A), and the
Federal Uniform Real Property Acquisition Policy, 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 4651 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1989) (Addendum B).

Ferrebee also

presented evidence of the County's bad faith in bringing and
prosecuting this action.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The trial court entered a ruling in favor of Ferrebee

on August 29, 1989, after completion of a four-day bench
trial.

R. 431.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were

entered on April 30, 1990. R. 413 (Addendum C to this brief).
Final Judgment was entered on June 14, 1990. R. 415 (Addendum
D to this brief).

The County filed a notice of appeal on July

6, 1990, R. 420, and Ferrebee filed a notice of cross-appeal
on July 17, 1990. R. 424.
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The trial court found that the County had initiated a

condemnation action in 1975 to obtain approximately 37 acres
of Ferrebee's 80-acre parcel of property in order to construct
the Tooele County Airport.

R. 412. On May 16, 1986, over

eleven years after the earlier proceeding, this condemnation
action against Ferrebee's remaining 43.66 acres was initiated.
The court made a factual finding that this 1986 condemnation
action was "a complete and separate action from the 1975
condemnation."

R. 412.

-4-

The trial court rejected the County's appraisals
because, among other reasons, they were basefr upon comparables
from depressed sales which were not competently adjusted.
411.

The court found the appraisal of J. Philip Cook to be

the best estimate of the property's fair marfket value.
411.

R.

R.

Consistent with the Cook appraisal, the court determined

that the base agricultural value of the property was $52,000.
R. 411, Exhibit 91 at 44. The court noted that Ferrebee had
an option to acquire a narrow strip of land,needed to access
the subject property, which had become landlocked after the
1975 condemnation, for the market value of $500 per acre.
411.

R.

This adjoining access property was owhed by a long-time

friend and tenant of Ferrebee's property, Flloyd Walters.
However, based upon an unexercised option Pjerrebee had
subsequently obtained from Walters to acquire the access
property for $5,000 per acre, the court decocted $19,240 from
the $52,000 base value of the property as $n access
adjustment.

R. 410.

After deducting access costs, the trial court then
added $40,950 (125% of the reduced base agricultural value) as
an enhancement for the property's increaseji value due to its
proximity to the airport.

R. 410. This enhancement was based
I

on comparable sales of land adjacent to otiier rural airports.
R. 410. This resulted in a total fair market value figure of
$74,000.

R. 410. The trial court ordere4 an award of this
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amount, less the County's payment of $9,004.87 already
deposited with the court, plus interest.

R. 414.

The trial

court also awarded $826.31 in property taxes paid by Ferrebee
and $307.32 in costs.

R. 414.

With regard to the state and federal relocation acts,
the court found that the County did not comply with the
procedures therein mandated in that the County (1) failed to
act expeditiously to acquire the subject property by
negotiations, (2) failed to notify Ferrebee that the County
was having the subject property appraised, (3) failed to allow
Ferrebee to accompany the County's appraiser during his
inspection, (4) failed to offer Ferrebee the lowest appraisal
amount for the purchase of the subject property and (5) failed
to disclose to Ferrebee the basis for the dollar amount used
by the County in negotiations with Ferrebee.

R. 411-12. The

trial court ruled, however, that the state and federal
relocation acts do not apply to this case. R. 411-412. The
factual findings listed above were made by the court to avoid
the necessity of a remand in the event the acts are determined
to apply on appeal.

-6-

C0UNTER-8TATEMENT OF FACT8
The County's statement fails to convey accurately the
factual matters most relevant to the disposition of this
appeal and cross-appeal.

Ferrebee, therefore, submits this

counter-statement.
A project to develop the Tooele Coijinty Airport was
originally conceived in the late 1960's. R[ 435 at 18. The
final plans adopted by the County required the use of 37 acres
of an 80-acre parcel owned by Ferrebee.

In February 1975, the

County condemned approximately 37 acres of [Ferrebee's land.
R. 435 at 123. The 1975 taking was concluded by jury verdict
in May 1979. R. 188. Immediately after these proceedings
concluded, Ferrebee was approached by a county official,
Commissioner Buzianis, who expressed an interest in
participating with Ferrebee in the commercial development of
the remaining property.

R. 439 at 814-15.

Commissioner

Buzianis remarked that Ferrebee's remaining parcel was very
valuable.

Id.

As a result of the County's 1975 taking, the
remaining 43.66 acres of Ferrebee's parcelI were landlocked,
However, Floyd Walters, a long-time friend) of Ferrebee and
tenant of Ferrebee's property owned an adjfining parcel and
promised Ferrebee free use of his property to access the

I
remaining landlocked parcel. R. 439 at 657-659. Walters also
granted Ferrebee an option to obtain access for fair market

-7

value (estimated at $500 per acre) and, s h o r t l y before the
present condemnation proceeding began, granted a second option
t o obtain a c c e s s for $5,000 per a c r e .

Both o p t i o n s were in

e f f e c t a t the time of t r i a l , 5
In May of 1981, a Metropolitan Air Systems Plan for
t h e S a l t Lake City/Provo/Ogden area was formally proposed by
the Wasatch Front Regional Counsel on Aviation and the
Mountain Lands A s s o c i a t i o n of Governments.

R. 435 a t 38.

This plan recommended s u b s t a n t i a l changes t o and expansion of
the Tooele V a l l e y a i r p o r t as a means of meeting the demands of
t h e i n c r e a s i n g volume of Wasatch Front a i r t r a f f i c .
The County t h e r e a f t e r created a Master Plan Task
Force i n 1982.

That task force u l t i m a t e l y r e j e c t e d the

Metropolitan Air Systems Plan proposal and, a f t e r e v a l u a t i n g
s e v e r a l other p l a n s , commenced work on developing t h e Tooele
County Bolinder F i e l d Master Plan (master plan) for expansion
of t h e a i r p o r t .

R. 435 at 47, 134, 260.

The master plan

a n t i c i p a t e d t h e Tooele a i r p o r t ' s s t a t u s as a r e l i e v e r a i r p o r t
for t h e S a l t Lake I n t e r n a t i o n a l Airport and c a l l e d for

The $500 per acre option was granted in 1979. R. 439 at 660. Although
t h i s w r i t t e n option expired in December 1981, Walters and Ferrebee
agreed that the parcel described i n the option would remain a v a i l a b l e
for purchase at market value at any time. R. 439 at 658-63. In April
1986, when condemnation of the subject property appeared imminent,
Ferrebee, at the i n s i s t e n c e of h i s attorney, entered i n t o the $5,000
per acre o p t i o n . R. 439 at 665-66. Walters t e s t i f i e d that t h i s 1986
option agreement did not suspend operation of h i s prior informal, $500
per acre agreement with Ferrebee. R. 439 at 665-66.

-8

significant expansion.

R. 435 at 134. The County's master

plan was approved by the county commission 4 n d
commission in the spring of 1986.

the

R. 435 at 52.

planning
In order to

implement its adopted master plan, the County passed a
resolution to condemn the remaining 43.66 aires of Ferrebee's
property on April 22, 1986.

R. 435 at 261-62.

Following the promulgation of the May 1981
Metropolitan Air Systems Plan, and anticipating the need to
acquire at least part of Ferrebee's remaining parcel, the
County mentioned to Ferrebee in September 1981 that it had an
interest in acquiring an additional portion) of his property.
R. 439 at 817. Thereafter, the County conducted two
appraisals.

In November 1981, the County commissioned Jerry

R. Webber to appraise approximately 16 acres of Ferrebee's
remaining parcel.

R. 437 at 321-22. Mr. Webber's 1981

appraisal concluded that the fair market value of Ferrebee's
property was $1,750 per acre.

R. 437 at 3^7, Exhibit 4 at 14.

In December 1981 the County ordered a secohd appraisal of the
same 16 acres of Ferrebee's parcel by William L. Allsop.

R.

435 at 192; R. 440 at 891. Mr. Allsop's appraisal concluded
that the property was worth $4,500 per acrb.
Exhibit 65 at 5.

R. 440 at 891,

Neither the Webber nor t^he Allsop appraisal

allowed for an enhancement based on the siibject property's
proximity to the airport.

The County's 1981 appraisals and

-9-

discussions with Ferrebee did not result in a formal offer to
purchase any portion of the Ferrebee property.
In September 1983 the County applied for a federal
assistance grant through the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) for money to fund the airport expansion project.

The

County's application budgeted $1,750 per acre to acquire the
subject property as set forth in the 1981 appraisal by Mr.
Webber.

R. 435 at 231-32.

In connection with its efforts to

obtain federal funding, the County provided written assurance
to the FAA that it would comply with the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal
and Federally Assisted Programs. R. 437 at 208-09; Exhibit
51; R. 437 at 236.
In February of 1985, the County commissioned Mr.
Webber to appraise the subject property so that a more recent
appraisal could be furnished to the FAA in connection with the
County's application for federal funding.

R. 437 at 101, 349.

Contrary to the state and federal real property acquisition
policies, Ferrebee was neither invited to accompany Webber
while performing the 1985 appraisal nor was he informed that
the appraisal had been ordered.

R. 437 at 383. Mr. Webber's

1985 appraisal was based on comparables furnished by the
County and on comparables from a large scale liquidation of
property by Leucadia National Corporation d/b/a Terracor (the
Terracor Sales).

R. 435 at 213; R. 437 at 455. The Terracor
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sales involved the liquidation of over 1,00Q acres of property
in the relevant area between mid-1983 and 1^85.
422.

R. 437 at

These properties were sold by Terracor at a loss.

R.

437 at 455. Additionally, Webber's 1985 appraisal did not
I
consider the availability of water on the subject property, R.
437 at 440, nor did the appraisal use comparables adjacent to
rural airports.

R. 437 at 448. Mr. Webber's 1985 appraisal

resulted in a valuation of only $275 per acre —
decrease from his 1981 appraisal.

an 85%

R. 435 at 215, Exhibit 11

at 15.
The drastic contrast between Mr. Webber's 1981 and
i

1985 appraisals necessitated that the County order a review of
Webber's 1985 appraisal by George Y. Fugii. R. 437 at 479-80.
Mr. Fugii refused to defend Webber's 1985 appraisal and
levelled abundant and penetrating criticism against it.
Exhibit 15. An important criticism was th£t the 1985 Webber
appraisal relied heavily on the Terracor sales, R. 4 38 at 588,
at a time when "Terracor was trying to sell out." R. 438 at
590.

Mr. Fugii criticized Webber's conclusion that the

highest and best use of the property was for agricultural

I
purposes because the appraisal offered no support for the
conclusion.

Exhibit 15 at 2. Additionally, Mr. Fugii noted

that Webber's appraisal failed to provide any supporting data
to substantiate the appraisal's 50% downward adjustment for
the landlocked condition of the subject property. R. 437 at
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388.

Mr. Fugii ultimately concluded that Mr. Webber "[was]

not qualified to make this type of appraisal."

R. 438 at 566,

Exhibit 15 at 3.
In March 1986, more than four years after the County
first appraised the subject property, the County communicated
its first formal offer in writing to acquire Ferrebee's
property.

R. 435 at 246; Exhibit 12. At the time of the

offer, the County had received appraisals of $1,750 per acre
(the Webber 1981 appraisal), $4,500 per acre (the 1981 Allsop
Appraisal) and a $275 per acre appraisal which had been
totally discredited by Mr. Fugii.

In spite of the foregoing,

the County offered Ferrebee only $275 per acre for his
property plus a $200 per acre "incentive" to avoid litigation.
R. 435 at 109, 247. Additionally, after waiting well over
four years to make an offer of purchase, the County demanded a
response within two weeks.

R. 435 at 248. Mr. Ferrebee

rejected the County's offer of purchase.
In preparation for litigation, Mr. Fugii was retained
by the County's attorney to perform his own appraisal of the
subject property.

R. 437 at 492.

In spite of his sharp

criticism of the Webber appraisal for its reliance on the
Terracor liquidation sales, eight of the ten comparables used
by Mr. Fugii were Terracor liquidations.

Exhibit 17 at 15-18.

Mr. Fugii testified that these comparables were used because
there were few other comparables available.
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R. 437 at 502; R.

439 at 626.

The property's proximity to th^ airport did not

influence Mr. Fugii's valuation and comparables adjacent to
rural airport property were not used in his appraisal.
at 601-02.

R. 4 38

Fugii deducted 65% of his computed value of the

subject property as the cost of acquiring access to arrive at
i

a v a l u a t i o n of only $240 per acre.

Exhibit'17 at 24.

At t r i a l , the t r i a l court received) the a p p r a i s a l s of
two experts obtained by Mr. Ferrebee as evidence of the
subject property's value.

P h i l i p A. S n e l l determined the

value of the s u b j e c t property t o be $2,270 per a c r e .
23 a t i v . 6

Exhibit

Mr. S n e l l concluded t h a t the h i g h e s t and b e s t use

of the property would "be a use t h a t would take advantage of
the unique l o c a t i o n adjacent t o the Tooele |Valley A i r p o r t . "
Exhibit 23 a t 13;

R. 439 at 709.

Reasoning from h i s expert

experience t h a t d i s t r e s s e d s a l e s are t y p i c a l l y discounted from
25% t o 35%, Mr. S n e l l adjusted the value o^ the 15 Terracor
i

s a l e s used as comparables in h i s appraisal I by 30%.
Exhibit
23 a t 23. Mr. S n e l l # s a n a l y s i s a l s o included 13 comparables
of vacant p r o p e r t i e s near a i r p o r t s in ruraJL l o c a t i o n s acquired

Mr. Snell prepared two a p p r a i s a l s , one in Aprilj of 1986 and a second
appraisal in March of 1989. R. 439 at 700-04. iThe f i r s t appraisal
concluded that the value of the property was $85,000 or approximately
$1,946 per acre. R. 439 at 703. Mr. Snell performed the second
appraisal a f t e r finding f a u l t with h i s f i r s t a p p r a i s a l ' s f a i l u r e to
evaluate the property's p o t e n t i a l use in connection with the needed
expansion of the a i r p o r t . R. 439 at 709. Mr. Snell intended h i s
second appraisal to supersede the f i r s t as h i s | expert opinion of the
subject property's value. R. 439 at 707.
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either for airport expansion or airport-related commercial
usage,

R. 439 at 712; Exhibit 23 at 21.

Information on these

comparables was obtained by consulting with other expert
appraisers, real estate agents and airport consultants.
Exhibit 23 at 15.

These properties showed an increase in

value due to the airport's influence ranging from 18% to 370%.
R. 439 at 713-14.7

After determining the property's base

value to be $1,153 per acre, Mr. Snell applied a conservative
100% adjustment as an enhancement for the property's proximity
to the airport and arrived at a value of $2,306 per acre.

R.

439 at 719, Exhibit 23.
The appraisal determined by the court to provide the
most accurate assessment of the subject property's fair market
value was performed by J. Philip Cook in July of 1989.
at 9, Exhibit 91.

R. 434

For his appraisal Mr. Cook acquired

regional social, economic, environmental and governmental
information and contacted the County concerning zoning, taxes
and availability of utilities.

R. 434 at 8.

After thoroughly

analyzing the feasible physical, legal and economic uses of
the subject property, Mr. Cook concluded that the "[h]ighest
present land value is obtained by agricultural uses on an

Mr. Snell's computation of the base value of the subject property did
not include an upward adjustment for the water availability because the
highest and best use of the property in connection with commercial or
industrial activity rendered irrigation unimportant. R. 439 at 798.
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interim basis, with the potential for future uses in
conjunction with the airport."

Exhibit 91 at 25-29.

Mr. Cook computed the agricultural base value of the
land by using comparables from the period 1983-1986.

R. 434

at 14. Terracor sales used as comparables were adjusted by a
very conservative 10% due to the distressed nature of the
sales.

R. 434 at 18-19; Exhibit 91 at 35.

Cook's computation

of the subject property's base value also included an analysis
of the property's water availability.

R. 4J4 at 26. In

addition, Mr. Cook applied a large 37% downward adjustment for
the landlocked condition of the property,

K. 434 at 33.

Applying these considerations, Mr. Cook determined the value
of the property to be $750 per acre.

Exhibit 91 at 40.

Mr. Cook then considered any property value
enhancement attributable to the subject property's proximity
to the airport.

For this purpose, Mr. COOK verified sales of

six agricultural properties adjacent to basic utility airports
in rural communities.

Exhibit 91 at 43.

Of these six

comparables, two were court ordered condemnation awards and
were thus given less weight by Mr. Cook, even though the
premiums paid in those sales were similar to negotiated
transactions.

Exhibit 91 at 43. These comparables indicated

an airport proximity enhancement factor of 22% to 369%.
Exhibit 91 at 44. Mr. Cook selected a conservative
enhancement factor of 125% and applied this to the base
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agricultural value less the cost of access. R. 434 at 42;
Exhibit 91 at 44. This resulted in an ultimate valuation of
$74,000 or approximately $1,695 per acre.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The County asserts that the trial court/s judgment
must be reversed for three interrelated reasons. First,
Ferrebee ostensibly did not "carry his burden" of
demonstrating that he is entitled to an enhanced value for the
subject property.

App. Br. 15. Second, the County asserts

that, as a matter of law, no enhanced value can be awarded for
the subject property's proximity to the airport.
16.

Id.

at 15-

Third, the County claims that the trial court's decision

is based on incompetent and inadmissible evidence.

Id.

at 16.

None of these submissions merit reversal.
To begin with, the County's second argument —

i.e.,

that the trial court's award of an enhanced value is legally
flawed —
law.

itself rests upon a serious distortion of applicable

An owner of property condemned for public use is

entitled to any enhanced value of the property flowing from
prior condemnation proceedings so long as the present
condemnation action is separate and distinct from the prior
government development.

United

14 (1970); United

v. Miller,

States

States

v. Reynolds,

317 U.S. 369 (1943).

Here, the trial court specifically found that this
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397 U.S.

condemnation action was "a complete and separate action from
the 1975 condemnation.1' R. 412. This factual finding is not
clearly erroneous and, therefore, must be affirmed by this
Court.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Because Ferrebee is legally entitled to the enhanced

value he sought for his property, the County's
:yJ first and third
submissions (i.e., that Ferrebee did not factually support his
valuation claim and/or supported it with inadmissible
evidence) fall like a house of cards.

The prial court did not

abuse its discretion in concluding that the Cook appraisal
represented the best evidence of the subject property's value.
That appraisal carefully examined all factors necessary to an
appropriate determination of value, including the feasible
physical, legal and economic uses of the property.

The

County's objections regarding the "admissibility" of the Cook
appraisal, moreover, are misplaced.

An expert's opinion may

be partially based on inadmissible evidence —

so long as such

evidence is the type reasonably relied upon by experts in a
given field.

Utah R. Evid. 703. Mr. Cookrs appraisal plainly

meets that standard.

Thus, the errors assorted by the County

are without substance.
The trial court, however, did errl in two respects.
The court deducted $19,240 from the base agricultural value of
the land as the cost of obtaining access to the property.
This calculation was based on a $5,000 perf acre option
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agreement between Ferrebee and his adjoining tenant, rather
than upon the actual fair market cost of obtaining access for
which Ferrebee also held an opinion.

This is clear error.

An

option contract, because of its inherent uncertainty, is
inadmissible as a matter of law and irrelevant to issue of
fair market value.
(5th Cir. 1966).

United

States

v. Smith,

355 F.2d 807, 811

As a result, the cost of access to the

property should be based on fair market value —

not on the

speculative and inflated option price.
Finally, the court erred in failing to award
attorneys' fees and appraisal costs to Ferrebee.

Attorney's

fees and appraisal costs are properly awardable under general
equitable principals and required to be awarded under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987, as amended).

The County's failure

to comply with the provisions of the Federal Uniform Real
Property Acquisition Policies and the Utah Relocation
Assistance Act —
the FAA —

despite its agreement to the contrary with

evidences the County's bad faith.

Indeed, the

actions of the County here demonstrate abusive, heavy-handed
treatment and complete disregard of the legitimate rights and
interests of property owners and merit the imposition of costs
and attorney's fees to discourage similar actions in the
future.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Ferrebee Is Entitled To The Enhanced Value Of His
Property Stemming Prom The Original Airport Project
Because This Condemnation Is A Separate And Unrelated
Proceeding Necessitated By The Airport's
Unanticipated Expansion
United

States

v. Miller,

317 U.S. 369 (1943),
I

prescribes the dispositive test to determine whether a
condemnee is entitled to receive the value cj>f his property as
enhanced by previous government development of adjoining
lands.

The Miller

test provides:

If a distinct tract is condemned, in
whole or in part, other lands in tljie
neighborhood may increase in market value due
to the proximity of the public improvement
erected on the land taken. Should)the
Government, at a later date, determine to
take these other lands, it must pay their
market value as enhanced by this factor of
proximity. If, however, the public project
from the beginning included the taking of
certain tracts, but only one of thpm is taken
in the first instance, the owner olf the other
tracts should not be allowed an increased
value for his lands. . .
The question is whether the Respondents'
lands were probably within the scope of the
project from the time the Government was
committed to it. If they were not, but were
merely adjacent lands, the subsequent
enlargement of the project to include them
ought not deprive the respondents of the
value added in the meantime by th^ proximity
of the improvement.
Miller,

317 U.S. at 376-77.
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This test was reaffirmed by Supreme Court 21 years
after Miller

in United

States

v. Reynolds,

397 U.S. 14 (1970),

in which the Court stated:
[T]he development of a public project may also
lead to enhancement in the market value of
neighboring land that is not covered by the
project itself. And if that land is later
condemned, whether for an extension of the
existing project or for some other public
purpose, the general rule of just compensation
requires that such enhancement in value be
wholly taken into account, since fair market
value is generally to be determined with due
consideration of all available economic uses
of the property at the time of the taking.
Id.

at 16-17 (emphasis supplied).
Whether a second taking is within the scope of the

original project for purposes of applying Miller

is to be

answered by determining the reasonable expectation of the
ordinary land owner. United
(9th Cir. 1983); see also

States
United

v. Eastman,
States

728 F.2d 417, 420 (10th Cir. 1984).

714 F.2d 76, 77

v. 65.0 Acres

of

Land,

Additionally, even when

the subject property is initially within the scope of the
original project, the government must pay enhanced value when
subsequent government action creates a reasonable belief on
the part of the landowner that his property has been removed
from the original project's scope. 65.0 Acres
F.2d at 420; United

States

v. 49.01

1364, 1367 (10th Cir. 1982).
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Acres

of Land, 728

of Land,

669 F.2d

Whether the subject property is witjhin the scope of
the original project presents a question of (fact. Mobile
v. Brantly,

507 So, 2d 483, 486 (Ala, 1987).

Co.

Likewise, the

reasonable expectation of the landowner is ai factual issue.
Eastman,

714 F.2d at 77.

In the instant case, the trial court

made a factual determination that "[t]he 1986 condemnation was
a complete and separate action from the 1975 condemnation."
R. 412. This factual determination may be reversed only if
"clearly erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)? State
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

v. Walker,

Application of the law to the

facts of this case shows that the trial court's valuation was
clearly correct.
When the County prepared preliminary airport plans in
the early 1970's, it briefly considered a more expansive
condemnation project which would have included most of
Ferrebee's 80-acre parcel; however, the original airport plan
actually implemented by the County necessitated the
acquisition of only the 37 acres that were condemned in 1975.
During the course of planning and construct^ion of the airport
under the original plan the acquisition of additional land was
not contemplated.

In fact, there is no evidence in the record

that the County anticipated the need for airport expansion
until 1980 when aviation studies suggested the future need for
the Tooele Valley Airport to relieve the Silt Lake
International Airport of some of its air traffic.
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The County, of course, makes much of the fact that
Ferrebee was contacted in September 1981 regarding acquisition
of his property.

App. Br. 4.

This contact, however, does not

show that Ferrebee had any "reasonable expectation" in 1975 —
at the outset of the original proceeding —
would once again be subject to condemnation.

that his property
To the contrary

the record demonstrates that Ferrebee had no such expectation
until five years later when the 1980 aviation studies were
prepared.

A property owner certainly cannot be required to

anticipate government action which the government itself did
not anticipate; to rule otherwise would ignore the distinction
between "reasonable expectation" and clairvoyance.

Nor can

the County claim that the subject property was within the
scope of the original project based on an abandoned
preliminary plan to obtain up to all of Ferrebee's property.
The County cannot reasonably be heard to contend that Ferrebee
must have reasonably expected that the County would condemn
his remaining property 11 years after the first taking when
the airport as originally planned and constructed required
none of Ferrebee's property beyond the 37 acres taken in 1975.
The County's statement in its opening brief that it
took only 37 acres of Ferrebee's 80 acre parcel in 1975
because of "budgetary restraints" is wholly unsupported by the
record.

App. Br. 4.

Moreover, the County would have been

constitutionally forbidden from taking more property than the
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37 acres needed to construct the airport as designed in the
adopted final plans.

While state and federal constitutions

permit private property to be taken for a "public use" (U.S.
Const. Amend. V; Utah Const. § 22), the sco^e of a project
defines the outer perimeters of the "public [use." The scope
of the original airport project necessitated the public's use
of 37 acres and

—

"budgetary restraints" or not —

no more

could have been taken by the County at that point.
Acquisition of the subject property in the second
condemnation was thus not within the scope pf the original
project, nor was it within Ferrebee's reasonable expectations.
The trial court's finding of fact that "the 1986 condemnation
was a complete and separate action from the 1975 condemnation"
is not clearly erroneous and the court's decision to allow
Ferrebee to recover the enhanced value of the subject property
must stand.
The County's contrary argument on phis point rests on
the contention that enhanced values arising from the very
condemnation proceedings by which property is acquired are not
recoverable.
Cors,
Salt

The County correctly cites United

States

337 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1949), and Redevelopment
Lake City

v. Grutter,

v.
Agency of

734 P.2d 434 (Ut^ah 1986), in

support of this proposition.

The principle, however, is
I

irrelevant to this case because Ferrebee has not been awarded
an enhancement flowing from the 1986 condemnation.
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Rather,

the enhancement of the subject property's value was realized
in 1975 when 37 acres of Ferrebee's property were taken for
the original airport.

And, consistent with Miller,

Reynolds

and Utah statutory provisions on eminent domain, Ferrebee is
entitled to the actual value of his property as measured on
the date of the service of summons (May 16, 1986).
Ann. § 78-34-11 (1987) ; Intermountain
Irons

Recreation

App. 1990).

Land & Cattle

Co.,

Power

Agency

Utah Code
v.

Bowers-

786 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct.

Thus, the trial court correctly included in this

value any enhancement derived from the government's use of
Ferrebee's property acquired in 1975.
II.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Adopting The Appraisal Of J. Philip Cook As The Best
Estimate Of The Property's Fair Market Value
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that Ferrebee is

entitled to the value of the subject property as enhanced by
its proximity to the airport.

The appraisals of Phillip A.

Snell and J. Philip Cook considered this enhancement in their
valuations.

The trial court adopted Mr. Cook's appraisal as

the best estimate of the subject property's fair market value.
R. 410.

In challenging the trial court's adoption of the Cook

appraisal and arguing its admissibility, the County must
establish that the trial court acted so clearly outside reason
as to be arbitrary and capricious.
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Peatross

v. Board

of

Commissioners,

555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976)| • This the County

cannot do.
A.

The Cook Appraisal Properly Determined That The
Highest and Best Use Of The Property Was For
Interim Agricultural Use With Future Use In
Conjunction With The Airport

"The owner of property under condemnation is entitled
to a value based upon the highest and best ijise to which [the
property] could be put at the time of the taking, without
State

limitation as to the use then actually madei of it."
v. Jacobs,

307 P.2d 463, 464 (Utah 1964)(emphasis supplied).

Highest and best use thus includes a use "reasonably likely to
take place in the near future, whereby availability of this
future use would have affected the market price."
States

v. 46,672.96

Acres

of Land,

521 F.2<d 13, 15 (10th Cir.

1975)(emphasis supplied)(citing, Wilson
F.2d 901 (10th Cir. 1965)).

United

v. United

States,

350

Additionally, the highest and

best use of a parcel may be found to be a ijse in conjunction

'i

with other parcels, and any increment of Vc lue resulting from
from a combination of parcels may be taken into consideration
States
v. Fuller,
I
Finally, the admission of evidence

in valuing the parcel condemned.
U.S. 488, 490 (1973).

United

409

regarding highest and best use lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Jacobs,

39t P.2d at 464.

The County challenges the court's acceptance of Mr.
Cook's determination that the highest and test use of the
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property is for interim agricultural use with future use in
conjunction with the airport.

App. Br. 18. The County

asserts that "highest and best use" may be determined only by
reference to the physical, legal, and economic uses of
Id.

property.

This three-part test, however, is the product

of academic dialogue only and has not been discussed in
relevant case law.

The controlling test for highest and best

use contained in the cases focuses on the reasonable
probability of a use.
v. 46,672.96

Acres

State

v. Jacobs,

of Land, supra.

supra;

United

States

Nevertheless, as

demonstrated below, the trial court's acceptance of the Cook
appraisal's conclusion regarding highest and best use of the
subject property is supported by abundant evidence and meets
not only the applicable legal test derived from case law, but
also the three-part test propounded by the County.
As an initial matter, it is quite clear that the
subject property was physically suitable for the highest and
best use found by the trial court.

The trial court was

presented with the ultimate conclusion of two appraisers that
the highest and best use of the property was for interim
agricultural use with future use in conjunction with the
airport.

R. 434 at 11; Exhibit 91 at 29; R. 439 at 709, 737-

42; Exhibit 23 at 13-14.

Moreover, even the County's

appraiser, Mr. Fugii, testified consistently with Mr. Cook and
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Mr. Snell that the physical characteristics of the land would
support commercial and industrial development.

R. 438 at 516.

Regarding legal feasibility, the County's contention
(App. Br. 18-20) that zoning restrictions prohibited
commercial use of the subject property ignotes the fact that
highest and best use analysis transcends zoning limitations in
place when the property is condemned if a zbning change is
"reasonably probable."
Dunn,

Jacobs,

307 P.2d at)464; People

46 Cal. 2d 639, 297 P.2d 964, 966 (19^6).

v.

Whether or

not a zoning change is "reasonably probable," moreover, is a
question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous rule.
Corp.

v.

1965).

District

of Columbia,

H &R

351 F.2d 740l, 742 (D.C. Cir.

Here, testimony at trial established that the

forecasted growth of the airport/s role in handling Wasatch
Front air traffic created a "good possibility" of a zoning
variance or zoning change.

R. 439 at 738.

Mr. Cook,

moreover, specifically analyzed the probability of a zoning
change in arriving at his estimation of value,8

and an

appraiser is reasonably expected to possess special knowledge
of the factors which bear upon the probability of a zoning
change.

0.040

Acres

of Land v.

State,

(1964).

The trial court's acceptance of tfye Cook appraisal,

57 lj>el. 173, 198 A. 2d 7

Mr. Cook specifically analyzed several zoning factors. These include
neighborhood conformity, access, likelihood of residential development
and any zoning ordinances applicable to the airport. Exhibit 91 at 2627.
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therefore, cannot be faulted on "legal feasibility" grounds.
Dunn, 297 P.2d at 966.
Regarding the element of economic feasibility, the
fact that the airport was expected to become an integral part
of the air systems needed along the Wasatch Front supports the
conclusion, offered by Mr. Snell, that there was a "strong
likelihood" of a demand for the property in conjunction with
the airport.

R. 439 at 741-42. Mr. Cook, in turn, thoroughly

evaluated demand for the property by reviewing aviation air
traffic studies, by considering the likelihood of the airport
attracting third-party operators to lease property for fixedbased operations, and by considering the likelihood of
through-the-fence access to the airport.

Based upon these

evaluations, Mr. Cook concluded that "demand is likely for
land surrounding the airport."

Exhibit 91 at 27-29.

In fact,

Ferrebee began experiencing demand for the subject property
immediately after completion of the 1975 condemnation
proceedings when he was approached by Commissioner Buzianis.
Mr. Buzianis told Ferrebee that the subject property was very
valuable and expressed his desire in participating with
Ferrebee in developing the subject property.

R. 439 at 812-

14.
In light of the testimony and evidence summarized
above, the trial court's finding regarding the property's
highest and best is well grounded.
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The trial court's

conclusion, far from being arbitrary and capricious, was based
upon appraisal evidence that carefully and expertly canvassed
all elements necessary to a sound estimation of value. The
trial court's adoption of the Cook appraisa][, therefore,
should be affirmed.

B.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Admitting The Cook Appraisal

The County argues that the trial c^urt erred in
relying on Mr. Cook's appraisal because the airport proximity
enhancement factor was based upon hearsay evidence and because
some of the comparable properties used in his appraisal were
acquired under threat of condemnation.

Theke arguments fail

because there is no requirement that expertj opinion be based
upon independently admissible evidence.

Moreover, the

admissibility of expert testimony is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, which was nojt abused in this
case.
1.

An Expert Appraisers Opinion Hay Be
Partially Derived From Hearsay

A trial court is allowed wide discretion in passing
on matters relating to expert testimony in condemnation cases.
United

States

v.

25.02

Acres

of Land,

495 F.2d 1398, 1401

(10th Cir. 1974)(citing Montana Ry Co. v. Warren,
(1890)).

137 U.S. 348

And, matters regarding the admission of expert
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testimony cannot be overruled unless there is a "clear showing
of abuse." Lamb v. Bangart,
1974).

525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah

The Utah Supreme Court has specifically applied this
Utah

rule in the context of condemnation proceedings.
of Transp.

v. Jones,

Dep't

694 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Utah 1984).

Once a witness is qualified as an expert by the trial
court he may base his opinion on reports, writings or
observations not in evidence which were made or compiled by
others, so long as they are the type reasonably relied upon by
experts in that particular field.
v. Clayton,

State

Utah R. Evid. 703;

646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982).

Specifically in

condemnation proceedings, an appraiser's valuation is
admissible even though it is based in part upon hearsay
derived from statements or reports of others.
S.E.2d 75, 81-82 (N.C. App. 1984); United
Acres,

558 F. Supp. 1238

1371 (8th Cir. 1984); City

In Re Lee,

States

v.

(W.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd,
of Portland

317

1,1014.16

739 F.2d

v. Nudelman,

45 Or.

App. 425, 608 P.2d 1190, 1195 (1980).
This rule is especially applicable in the context of
appraisers employing the comparable sales approach because the
appraiser is often required to obtain information from
reliable sources regarding comparable property.

As a result,

the appraiser is allowed wide latitude in gathering
information and may base his opinion on evidence not otherwise
admissible.

In Re Lee, 317 S.E.2d at 81.
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In the context of a

comparable sales appraisal, hearsay is routinely sought by the
appraiser as a standard method of appraising real estate.
at 82.

Id.

In the instant case, Mr. Cook testified that

appraisals based on comparable sales are often based on
information from reliable sources and that the sources relied
upon by him were highly reliable.

R. 434 at 40.

Additionally, his report indicates that the comparable sales
used to determine a value enhancement for airport proximity
were independently verified.

Exhibit 91 at 42.

The County complains of its inabilftlty to crossexamine the experts furnishing information to Mr. Cook.
However, the fact that an expert opinion isj based upon
statements or information compiled by others goes to the
weight to be given the expert opinion rathqr than its
admissibility.
Redevelopment
Inc.,

Clayton,

646 P.2d at 726; see

Agency of Salt

Lake City,

522 P.2d 1370, 1373 (1974).

v. Mitsui

also
Investment,

The Comity had the

opportunity to attempt to discredit Mr. Cook and to expose any
legitimate deficiencies in his opinion by challenging the
suitability and reliability of information upon which he
relied in forming his opinion during cross+examination.
Having failed in this opportunity, the County now contends
that the opportunity was insufficient.

The argument, however,

is contrary to sound reasoning and the lawj and must therefore
be rejected.
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2.

The T r i a l Court Did Mot Commit Clear Error By
Admitting An Appraisal Based In Part On S a l e s
Made Under Threat of Condemnation

Mr. Cook's a p p r a i s a l used s i x comparables involving
r u r a l property located adjacent t o small a i r p o r t s .
a t 42-43.

Exhibit 91

The u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of comparables involving

property adjacent t o a i r p o r t s required him t o use two
comparables which were sold a t a j u d i c i a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d p r i c e
in condemnation proceedings.

Exhibit 91 a t 43.

Mr. Cook's

a p p r a i s a l s t a t e s t h a t these comparables were c a u t i o u s l y
considered because they were condemnation s a l e s , but a l s o
indicated t h a t "the premium in these cases i s very s i m i l a r t o
t h e premiums paid in negotiated t r a n s a c t i o n s . "
43.

Exhibit 91 a t

The County argues t h a t such comparables are inadmissible

and t h a t Mr. Cook's a p p r a i s a l must be r e j e c t e d on t h i s b a s i s .
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s acceptance of Mr. Cook's a p p r a i s a l , however,
e a s i l y withstands t h i s challenge for several reasons. 9
F i r s t , as noted j u s t above, an e x p e r t ' s opinion i s
admissible even though i t i s p a r t i a l l y based on inadmissible
evidence — such as condemnation s a l e s .

Utah R. Evid. 703.

A t r i a l court i s allowed wide d i s c r e t i o n in passing on matters r e l a t i n g
to expert testimony i n condemnation c a s e s . United States v. 25.02
Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1398, 1401 (10th Cir. 1 9 7 4 ) ( c i t a t i o n omitted).
Thus, the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n to admit the testimony of Mr. Cook can
be reversed only upon a "clear showing of abuse." Lamb v. Bangarty ,
525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974). This standard has s p e c i f i c a l l y been
applied in the context of a t r i a l j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n to admit or exclude
comparable s a l e s . S t a t e v. Kunimoto, 62 Haw. 502, 617 P.2d 93, 97
(Haw. 1980).
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All of the cases cited by the County to support its position
pre-date the 1975 adoption of Rule 703 of ti}e Federal Rules of
Evidence which abandoned the requirement thkt an expert form
his opinion based on personal knowledge or ^acts made known to
him in court.

Utah Rule of Evidence 703 wast adopted in 1971

and follows the federal rule verbatim.

Like the federal rule,

Utah's adoption of Rule 703 rendered obsolete the requirement
of the predecessor to Utah's Rule 703, RuleJ56(2), that an
expert's opinion be based upon personal knowledge or courtroom
information.

Utah R. Evid. 703 (advisory committee note).

All of the cases cited by the County to support its position
predate this reversal of the law and are therefore negated by
the change effectuated by the adoption of Rule 703.
Second, the comparables complained! of by the County
have not been admitted as direct substantive evidence of the
condemned property's value.

Rather, the cojmparables were

merely used as a basis in forming an expertj opinion.
is the expert opinion which is admitted as jevidence —
comparable sales upon which the opinion is based.

And, it
not the

In this

situation, the requirement of showing similarity between the
subject property and other comparables is hot as rigorous as
when comparable sales are offered as substantive proof of
value.

f=3CUnited States v. 0.161 Acres of Land, 837 F.2d

1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 1988).

Thus, the fact that comparables

acquired under the threat of condemnation \|ere used in Mr.
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Cook's opinion speaks only to the credibility of his expert
Kunimoto,

opinion, not its admissibility.

617 P.2d 93, at 98.

As a result, it is not an abuse of discretion to accept an
expert appraisal using comparables of other sales under threat
of condemnation. Honolulu

Redevelopment

Agency

v.

Pun Gun, 49

Haw. 640, 426 P.2d 324, 328 (1967).
Finally, the County's argument is especially anemic
in light of the dearth of comparables available.

In

situations where there are few instances of comparable sales,
the appraiser's opinion need not be derived from objective
market data.

United

States

v. 25.7

1396, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1986).

Acres

of Land,

789 F.2d

None of the cases cited by the

County to support its position involve a situation where there
was an inadequate number of comparable sales.

Moreover, when

there is a necessity for evidence because the only sales of
comparable property have been under threat of condemnation,
such comparables may be independently admissible even as
direct substantive evidence.
426 P.2d at 325-26;

City

Serv.

Honolulu

and County
Co.,

Redevelopment
of Honolulu

Agency,

v.

International

Air

(Haw. 1981).

In this case, the comparables were not admitted

63 Haw. 322, 628 P.2d 192, 198

as direct substantive evidence, but were merely used in
forming an expert opinion offered as evidence.

Therefore, in

this context, there can be no question but that the trial
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court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Mr. Cook's
appraisal.
III.

The Trial Court Erred In Using An inadmissible Option
Agreement To Determine The Cost Of Accessing The
Condemned Property
The 1975 condemnation action left JFerrebee with 43.66

landlocked acres. At the conclusion of the 1986 condemnation
action, the trial court's final order deducted $19,240 from
the agricultural base value of the land as the cost of
obtaining access. R. 410. Rather than basing the amount of
this adjustment on the $500 per acre appraised value of the
adjoining property, which the court found do be the most
likely measure of value to be adopted between Ferrebee and his
tenant Floyd Walters, who owned the adjacent access property,
based upon their informal agreement, R. 431 at 5, the court
based the amount of the adjustment on an unexercised 1986
written option agreement granting Ferrebee the right to
acquire the same access property at ten times its fair market
value.

R. 439 at 652; R. 411; R. 439 at 665. This option

agreement was executed at the insistence of Ferrebee's
attorney in spite of the fact that Ferrebee had a gentleman's
agreement with Mr. Walters which allowed Ferrebee free access
over the Walters' leased property and an informal agreement to
acquire any needed access at fair market value.

R. 439 at

658-66, 812. This informal agreement was peither superseded
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nor affected by the 1986 option agreement and continued in
effect up to and including the date of condemnation.

R. 439

at 665-66.
As a matter of law, an option is inadmissible as
evidence of market value because the nature of an option is
"entirely too uncertain, shadowy and speculative to form a
solid foundation for determining value."
Smith,

United

355 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1966).

States

v.

Indeed, an option

agreement is typically induced by speculation and a
willingness to take a chance that uncertain events will occur
Id.

and make the option profitable.

Courts have therefore

reasoned that option "contracts [are] based upon so many
contingencies as to be meaningless on the issue of fair market
value."

Costello

Profit

Sharing

Trust

v. State

Roads Comm'n,
cert,

315 Md. 693, 556 A.2d 1102, 1105 (citations omitted)
denied,

110 S. Ct. 157 (1989).

Option agreements are thus

inadmissible for purposes of determining value.
F.2d at 811;

Costello

Profit

Sharing

Trust

v. State

Comm'n, 315 Md. 693, 556 A.2d 1102, 1104, cert,
Ct. 157 (1989); City

of Wichita

P.2d 351, 353 (1967);
(Tex. 1962); New Jersey

State

v. Jennings,

v. Williams,,

Turnpike

Authority

549, 143 A.2d 558, 562 (1958), cert,
(1959) .
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denied,

Smith,

denied,

355

Roads
110 S.

199 Kan. 621, 433
357 S.W.2d 799, 802
v. Bowley,

27 N.J.

358 U.S. 927

The soundness of the rule prohibiting the
admissibility of option agreements is illustrated by the
record in this case.

Mr. Cook's appraisal set the fair market

value of access to the subject property at $500 per acre,
Exhibit 91 at 42, and recognized that the 1^86 option at
$5,000 per acre was "substantially above market value on a per
acre basis." Id.

at 41-42.

Indeed, Mr. Walters had assured

Ferrebee of free access to the landlocked property since 1979
through the date of condemnation.

R. 439 at 658-60, 812. The

option, therefore, is pure speculation and pffers no
indication of the subject property's value.

By adopting the

option price as evidence to the subject property's value, the
court failed to distinguish expert evidence indicating value
from irrelevant speculation.
Mr. Cook's appraisal indicated that a fair market
purchase of access for the subject property would not
significantly reduce the value of the property (no more than
3.7% or $1,924).

Exhibit 91 at 42. Given the trial court's

inappropriate reliance on the 1986 option ih determining
value, this Court should deduct the cost of access based upon
the $500 per acre fair market value of the land needed for
access and adjust the value of the subject property
accordingly.

This would provide an ultimate valuation of

$52,000 (base agricultural value) less $1,924 (cost of access)
times 125% (the airport proximity enhancement factor), which
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equals $112,671. This result is legally sound and supports
practical concerns relating to the unreliability of an option
agreement as an indication of value.
IV.

The Trial Court Erred In Refusing To Award Ferrebee
Attorney's Fees And In Refusing To Award Ferrebee The
Cost Of Obtaining A Reliable Appraisal Based On The
County's Bad Faith Conduct
The trial court found that the the County did not

comply with the procedural requirements of the state and
federal relocation acts in that the county (1) failed to act
expeditiously to acquire Ferrebee7s property by negotiation,
(2) failed to notify Ferrebee that it was having the subject
property appraised, (3) failed to give Ferrebee an opportunity
to accompany the County's appraiser's during their inspection
of the property, (4) failed to offer Ferrebee the lowest
appraisal amount for purchase of the property and (5) failed
to make full disclosure to Ferrebee of information which was
the basis for the amount used by the County in negotiations
with Ferrebee.

R. 411-12.

Additionally, the County delayed

almost five years from the date of its first appraisal before
making an offer to Ferrebee.

Moreover, when the County did

make an offer of purchase, it ranged between seven and
eighteen times lower than the fair market value established by
the County's own prior appraisals.

Finally, the County's bad

faith was clearly underscored when it presented Ferrebee with
an ultimatum that the County's abusive offer be accepted
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within two weeks or costly litigation would be commenced.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the trial court denied
an award of attorney's fees or appraisal costs. This was
erroneous.
To refuse an award of attorney's f^es and appraisal
costs in these circumstances is to declare that, unless
private property owners possess sufficient personal resources
to pay substantial legal fees and appraisal costs, and unless
the difference between actual value and the government's
offered value is significant enough to justify the enormous
cost of litigation, private citizens are powerless to compel
fair treatment at the hands of a condemning authority.
Court should not condone this result.

The

The County's bad faith

conduct entitles Ferrebee to his attorney's fees and appraisal
costs.
A.

The County7s Bad Faith In Attempting To Condemn
Ferrebee's Property For Only $275 Per Acre
Justifies An Award of Attorney's Fees Under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56

Attorney's fees are recoverable when a statutory
basis for the award exists. Canyon Country

Store

781 P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1989)(citation omitted).

v.

Braceyf

In this

case, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987, as amended) provides
the statutory basis requiring an award of Attorney's fees.
That statute provides in relevant part:
In civil actions, the court shall 1 award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
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party if the court determines that the action
or defense to the action was without merit and
not brought or asserted in good faith• . . •
Id.(emphasis supplied).

The statute contains the dual

requirements that the action be (1) without merit and (2) not
brought in good faith.

An action lacks merit if it has "no

basis in law or fact." Cady v. Johnson,
(Utah 1983).

671 P.2d 149, 151

As to the second requirement, the County must be

deemed to have lacked good faith if any of the following
obtain: (1) the County lacked an honest belief in the
propriety of its activities; (2) the County intended to take
unconscionable advantage of Ferrebee; or (3) the County
intended its suit to hinder, delay or defraud Ferrebee. See,
Id.

Importantly, the statute's use of mandatory language

evidences the severely restricted discretion of the trial
court to award attorney's fees when the statutory conditions
are met.
1.

The Trial Court Erroneously Refused To
Award Attorney's Fees Based On Its
Conclusion That The Relocation Act Was
Inapplicable

The trial court's decision to refuse an award of
attorney's fees was erroneously based upon its conclusion that
the state and federal relocation acts are inapplicable to this
case.

Although the trial court noted that application of the

relocation acts would likely require that attorney's fees be
awarded, R. 431 at 6, it failed to recognize that § 78-27-56
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is a self-standina statute imposing the requirement of an
award of fees whenever litigation is conducted in bad faith.
And, the County's failure to comply with the relocation acts
— despite its agreement with the FAA to do so —
evidence of bad faith.

is abundant

Therefore, § 78-27-56 requires an

award of fees in this case without regard tcj) the applicability
of the relocation acts.
The principal purpose of the Utah Relocation Act "is
to establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable
treatment of persons displaced" by condemnation.
Ann. § 57-12-2 (1987, as amended)C.

Utah Code

While Ferrebee was not

"displaced" by the County's actions here, the Act also evinces
an intent to assure that eminent domain powers are exercised
with due consideration for the rights of all condemnees.
Section 57-12-13 evidences this purpose by providing:
Any Agency acquiring real property] as to which
it has the power to acquire under the eminent
domain or condemnation laws of thijs state
shall comply with the following policies:
(1) Every reasonable effort shall be made
to acquire expeditiously real| property by
negotiation.
(2) Real property shall be abpraised
before the initiation of negotiation, and
the owner or his designated
representative shall be given an
opportunity to accompany the appraiser
during his inspection of the property.
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations
for real property, an amount shall be
established which is reasonably believed
to be just compensation therefor, and
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such amount shall be offered for the
property. In no event shall such amount
be less than the lowest approved
appraisal of the fair market value of the
property. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 57-12-13 (l)-(3) (1987, as amended).
The trial court made specific findings of fact that
none of these requirements were met by the County.

Ferrebee

submits that the purpose and intent of the Act encompasses
this case and that the County's non-compliance with the Act's
procedural requirements further justifies an award of
attorney's fees under § 78-27-56.
Additionally, the Utah Neighborhood Development Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1201 et seq. (1987) evidences the
propriety of an award of fees in the instant case.

Section

17A-2-1238(2) of the Act provides for an award of attorney's
fees to a condemnee when the condemnee contests the condemning
authority's valuation of the property in court and receives an
award in excess of the condemning authority's pre-litigation
offer.

Though not directly applicable to the instant case,

this statute exemplifies the necessity of protecting
condemnees from the heavy-handed tactics of a condemning
authority.

Further, the statute illustrates the State of

Utah's policy of allowing attorney's fees to condemnees
subjected to governmental abuses —
ignored by the trial court.
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a well-established policy

2.

Section 78-27-56, Standing Alone,
Requires An Award of Attorney s Fees
Based On The County's Bad Faith

Analyzing § 78-27-56 alone, the conditions which
trigger the requirement of an award of fees are clearly met in
this case.

The County's strategy of browbeating Ferrebee into

accepting $275 per acre for the property, under the costly
threat of litigation, and its subsequent decision to pursue
that tactic through litigation, is not justified in fact and
is without merit given the County's certain knowledge that the
appraised value of the property was many times greater than
the offered amount.

At the time the County made its $275 per

acre offer to Ferrebee, it had received appraisals of the
subject property valuing the property at $l|,750 per acre and
$4,500 per acre. The fact that the County Jiad budgeted
$1,750 per acre to acquire the land in its application for FAA
funding is clear evidence of the County's legitimate belief as
to the subject property's value. Under thejse circumstances,
the $275 per acre appraisal upon which the
purchase was based was deceptive on its face. Additionally,
the $275 per acre appraisal had been been mortally discredited
and conclusively established as incompetent by the County's
own review appraisal.

It cannot be forgotten in this context

that the County is a public body with a duty to deal
faithfully and fairly with the public.
was, therefore, clearly without merit.
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The County's position

The County's bad faith in this action is likewise
readily apparent.

First, the County clearly lacked an honest

belief in the propriety of its effort to obtain the subject
property for $275 per acre when it had informed the FAA that
$1,750 per acre would be required for the subject property and
had applied for federal funding based on that amount.

Given

the $1,750 per acre and $4,500 per acre appraisals of the
property received by the County and the fact that the $275 per
acre appraisal had been wholly discredited, it is beyond
imagination to rationally suggest that the County had an
"honest belief" that the property was worth only $275 per
acre.

The County's efforts to obtain the property based on

this figure clearly represent an intention to take
unconscionable advantage of Ferrebee and to defraud him of his
right to receive just compensation.

Finally, the county's

unconscionable demand that Ferrebee accept the $275 offer
within only two weeks or face litigation is highly indicative
of the county's bad faith in its dealings with Ferrebee.
Therefore, the County's conduct clearly meets the bad faith
requirement.
In short, the County's conduct precipitating this
action has been reprehensible and flagrantly abusive.
action was without merit and brought in bad faith.

The

Such

conduct, if condoned, would give condemning authorities the
unfettered power to steal land from private citizens at values
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clearly below market rates by simply raising the iron fisted
threat of litigation, which in the ultimate irony would be
waged with the citizens7 own tax dollars.

Tpe only

alternative for the private citizen, especially in cases of
smaller economic scale, will be to cut losses and accept the
condemnor's offer.

'1

Our system of law and g vernment was born

of a need to restrict just such a disregard |of individual
rights.

Section 78-27-56 has no purpose at all if it cannot

be relied upon to remedy the County's conduct in this case.
The trial court's decision to refuse an awayd of attorney's
fees must be reversed.
B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In
Refusing To Award Ferrebee The Cost Of Obtaining
Credible Appraisals.

Ferrebee acknowledges that the Utah Court of Appeals
has ruled that expert witness fees are not awardable as part
of a condemnee's just compensation in condemnation
proceedings.
Daskalas,
granted,

Redevelopment

Agency of Salt

Lake City

785 P.2d 1112, 1123 (Utah Ct. App . 1989),
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).

v.
cert.

However, this Court has

granted certiorari to review that decision.

Moreover, the

instant case presents egregious circumstances.

Consideration

of the County's conduct mandates that Ferrebee be reimbursed
for his reasonable costs incurred in obtaining a credible
appraisal.

Ferrebee's only choice was to rfebut the County's
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bad faith offer with an expert's opinion to establish the
actual market value of the property.

It is simply inequitable

to require Ferrebee to absorb the significant costs of
appraisal caused by the County's attempt to pay an
unconscionably low price for his property.

CONCLUSION
The County's claims of error are meritless and the
trial court's rulings on those points should be affirmed.
judgment, however, should be modified to base the cost of
obtaining access on the fair market value of that access,
which in this case was $1,924.00.

Furthermore, Ferrebee

should be awarded his attorney's fees and appraisal costs.
DATED Wednesday this f(p

day of October, 1991

Respectfully Submitted,

Bv
Evail Al SchmutzNteseo
^ ^
HOLME/ROBERTS & OWEN
50 South Main Street,
Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Ferrebee
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The

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to tie mailed in the
United States mail, postage pre-paid, four cjopies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT this /&T day of
October, 1991, to the following:

David B. Thomas
Stoker & Thomas
311 South State Street, 4400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

57-11-19

57-11-19.

RELOCATION AOOiaiftiiv.

REAL ESTATE

CHAPTER 12
RELOCATION ASSISTANCE

Extradition proceedings against person charged
with crime.

In the proceedings for extradition of a person charged with a crime under
this act, it need not be shown that the person whose surrender is demanded
has fled from justice or at the time of the commission of the crime was in the
demanding or other state.
History: L. 1973, ch. 158, § 19.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 57-11-1.

Section
57-12-1.
57-12-2.
57-12-3.
57-12-4.
57-12-5.
57-12-6.

57-11-20.

Service of process.

57-12-7.

(1) In addition to the methods of service provided for in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, service may be made by delivering a copy of the process to the
office of the division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, which may be
the division in a proceeding instituted by it:
(a) forthwith sends a copy of the process and of the pleading by certified
or registered mail to the defendant or respondent at his last known address, and
(b) the plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with this section is filed in the
case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within such
further time as the court allows.
(2) If any person, including any nonresident of this state, engages in conduct prohibited by this act or any rule or order hereunder, and has not filed a
consent to service of process and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be obtained in this state, that conduct authorizes the division to receive
service of process in any noncriminal proceeding against him or his successor
which grows out of the conduct and which is brought under this act or any
rule or order hereunder, with the same force and validity as if served on him
personally. Notice shall be given as provided in Subsection (1).
History: L. 1973, ch. 158, § 20.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 57-11-1.

57-11-21.

Cross-References. — Service of process,
Rules 4 and 5, U.R.C.P.

Uniformity of construction.

This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it.
History: L. 1973, ch. 158, 8 21.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 57-11-1.
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Short title.
Declaration of policy.
Definitions.
Federal funds — Direct assistance.
Reimbursement of owner for expenses.
Buildings, structures or other improvements.
Replacement dwelling.

57-12-1.

Section
57-12-8.
57-12-9.
57-12-10.
57-12-11.
57-12-12.
57-12-13.

Advisory program.
Rules of displacing agency.
Displacing agency may contract
for services or function through
another agency.
Payments not income or resources
for welfare or tax purposes.
Judicial review.
Procedure for acquisition of property.

Short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Relocation Assistance Act."
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, § 1.
Meaning of "this act." - The term U)his

act" means L. 1972, ch. 24, §§ 1 through 13,
which appear as §§ 57-12-1 through 57-12-13.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Eminent Domain
Compensation in Western States: A Critique of
the Fair Market Value Model, 1984 Utah L.
Rev. 429.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent
Domain § 279.

57-12-2.

C.J.S. — 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 446.
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and application of state relocation assistance laws, 49
A.L.R.4th 491.
Key Numbers. — Eminent Domain «=> 301
et seq.

Declaration of policy.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of this act and of the state of Utah, and
the Legislature recognizes:
(1) That it is often necessary for the various agencies of state and local
government to acquire land by condemnation;
(2) That persons, businesses, and farms are often uprooted and displaced by such action while being recompensed only for the value of land
taken;
(3) That such displacement often works economic hardship on those
least able to suffer the added and uncompensated costs of moving, locating new homes, business sites, farms, and other costs of being relocated;
(4) That such added expenses should reasonably be included as a part
of the project cost and paid to those displaced;
(5) That the Congress of the United States has established matching
grants for relocation assistance, and has also established uniform policies
for land acquisition under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, to assist the states in meeting these
expenses and assuring that land is fairly acquired;
(6) That it is in the public interest for the state of Utah to provide for
such payments and to establish such land acquisition policies.
421

57-12-3

Therefore, the purpose of this act is to establish a uniform policy for the fair
and equitable treatment of persons displaced by the acquisition of real property by state and local land acquisition programs, by building code enforcement activities, or by a program of voluntary rehabilitation of buildings or
other improvements conducted pursuant to governmental supervision.
All of the provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to put into effect
the foregoing policies and purposes.
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, $ 2.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catehline following § 57-12-1
fied
Federal Law. — The Uniform Relocation

57-12-3.

KKLULA'l'IUN AOOloi/MNV.c

REAL ESTATE

Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, cited in Subsection (5), is codias 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq.

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) "Agency" means a department, division, agency, commission,
board, council, committee, authority, or other instrumentality of the state
or of a political subdivision of the state whether one or more.
(2) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, or association.
(3) "Displaced person" means any person who, after the effective date
of this act, moves from real property, or who moves his personal property
from real property, or moves or discontinues his business or moves his
dwelling as a result of the acquisition of the real property, in whole or in
part, or as a result of a written order of the acquiring agency to vacate
real property for a program of purchase undertaken by an agency or as a
direct result of code enforcement activities or a program of rehabilitation
of buildings conducted pursuant to a federal or state assisted program.
(4) "Non-profit organization" means all corporations, societies, and associations whose object is not pecuniary profit, but is to promote the
general interest and welfare of the members, whether temporal, social, or
spiritual.
(5) "Business" means any lawful activity, excepting a farm operation,
conducted primarily:
(a) for the purpose, sale, lease, or rental of personal or real property, and for the manufacture, processing, or marketing of products,
commodities, or any other personal property;
(b) for the sale of services to the public;
(c) by a nonprofit org^inizatiori^or
(d) for assisting in the purchase, sale, resale, manufacture, processing, or marketing of products, commodities, personal property, or
services by the erection and maintenance of an outdoor advertising
display or displays, whether or not such display or displays are located on the premises on which any of the above activities are conducted.
(6) "Farm operation" means any activity conducted solely or primarily
for the production of one or more agricultural products or commodities,
including timber, for sale or home use, and customarily producing such
products or commodities in sufficient quantity to be capable of contributing materially to the operator's support.
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History: L. 1972, ch. 24, $ 3.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 57-12-1.
Compiler's Notes. —- The term "effective

57-12-4.

date of this act" in Subsection (3) means the
effective date of L. 1972, ch. 24, i.e., March 30,
1972.

Federal funds — Direct assistance.

(1) When federal funds are available for payment of direct financial assistance to persons displaced by acquisition of real property by any agency, the
displacing agency is authorized to use such federal funds with state or local
funds to the extent provided by federal law and may provide such direct
financial assistance in the instances and on the conditions set forth by federal
law and regulations.
(2) When federal funds are not available or used for payment of direct
financial assistance to persons displaced by the acquisition of real property by
an agency, the displacing agency may provide direct financial assistance to
such persons. Financial assistance authorized by this Subsection (2) shall not
exceed the total amount that would have been payable under Subsection (1) of
this section if federal funds had been available or used.
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, § 4.

57-12-5.

Reimbursement of owner for expenses.

Any agency acquiring real property for its use shall as soon as practicable
after the date of payment of the purchase price or the date of deposit into court
of funds to satisfy the award of compensation in a condemnation proceeding to
acquire real property, whichever is the earlier, reimburse the owner, to the
extent the agency deems fair and reasonable, for expenses the owner necessarily incurred for:
(1) recording fees, transfer taxes, and similar expenses incidental to
conveying the real property to the agency;
(2) penalty costs for prepayment for any pre-existing recorded mortgage entered into in good faith encumbering the real property; and
(3) the pro rata portion of real property taxes paid which are allocable
to a period subsequent to the date of vesting title in the agency, or the
effective date of possession of such real property by the agency, whichever
is the earlier.
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, § 5.

57-12-6.

Buildings, structures or other improvements.

(1) Where any interest in real property is acquired, an equal interest in all
buildings, structures, or other improvements located upon the real property so
acquired and which is required to be removed from the real property or which
is determined to be adversely affected by the use to which the real property
will be put, shall be acquired.
(2) For the purpose of determining the just compensation to be paid for any
building, structure, or other improvement required to be acquired under Subsection (1), the building, structure, or other improvement shall be deemed to
be a part of the real property to be acquired, notwithstanding the right or
obligation of a tenant, as against the owner of any other interest in the real
423
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property, to remove the building, structure, or improvement at the expiration
of his term, and the fair market value which the building, structure, or improvement contributes to the fair market value of the property to be acquired,
or the fair market value of the building, structure, or improvement for removal from the real property, whichever is the greater, shall be paid to the
tenant therefor
(3) Payment for the buildings, structures, or improvements as set forth m
Subsection (2) shall not result m duplication of any payments otherwise authorized by state law No payment shall be made unless the owner of the land
involved disclaims all interest in the improvements of the tenant In consideration for any payment, the tenant shall assign, transfer, and release all his
right, title and interest in and to the improvements Nothing with regard to
this acquisition of buildings, structures, or other improvements shall be construed to deprive the tenants of any rights to reject payment and to obtain
payment for these property interests in accordance with other laws of this
state
History L 1972, ch 24, & 6

57-12-7.

Replacement dwelling.

(1) No person shall be required to move or be relocated from land used as
his residence and acquired under any of the condemnation or eminent domain
laws of this state until he has been offered a comparable replacement dwelling
which is a decent, safe, clean, and sanitary dwelling adequate to accommodate
this person, reasonably accessible to public services and places of employment,
and available on the private market
(2) If a program or project cannot proceed to actual construction because
comparable sale or rental housing is not available, and the head of the agency
determines that this housing cannot otherwise be made available, he may
take such action as is necessary or appropriate to provide this housing by use
of funds authorized for the project
(3) No person shall be required to move from his dwelling after the effective
date of this act, on account of any project of the agency, unless the agency
head is satisfied that replacement housing is available to this person
History L. 1972, ch 24, § 7
Compiler's Notes — For translation of ef

fective date of this act see note under same
catch)me following § 57 12 3

57-12-8. Advisory program.

(a) to determine the needs of displaced persons, business concerns, and
nonprofit organizations for relocation assistance,
(b) to assist owners of displaced businesses and farm operations in obtaining and becoming established in suitable business locations or replacement farms,
(c) to supply information concerning programs of the federal, state, and
local governments offering assistance to displaced persons and business
concerns,
(d) to assist in minimizing hardships to displaced persons in adjusting
to relocation, and
(e) to secure, to the greatest extent practicable, the co ordination of
relocation activities with other project activities and other planned or
proposed governmental actions in the community or nearby areas which
may affect the carrying out of the relocation program
History L 1972, ch 24, § 8
Meaning of "this a c t " — See note under
same catchhne following <* 57 12 1

57-12-9.

Compiler's Notes - For translation of ef
fective date of this act see note under same
catchhne following <) 57 12 3

Rules of displacing agency.

(1) The displacing agency shall enact rules to assure that
(a) the payments and assistance authorized by this chapter are administered in a manner that is fair, reasonable, and as uniform as practicable,
(b) a displaced person who makes proper application for a payment
authorized for him by this chapter is paid promptly after a move or, in
hardship cases, is paid in advance, and
(c) any person aggrieved by a determination as to eligibility for a
payment authorized by this chapter, or the amount of a payment, may
have his application reviewed by the head of the displacing agency
(2) The displacing agency shall comply with the procedures and require
ment8 of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings
History L 1972, ch 24, § 9, 1987, ch 161,
§ 193
Amendment Notes — The 1987 amend
ment effective January 1 1988 in the intro
ductory language of Subsection (1) substituted
enact rules to assure t h a t ' for promulgate

and adopt such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to assure deleted former SubBec
tion (lKd) pertaining to promulgation and
adoption of other rules and regulations and
added Subsection (2)

(1) Whenever the acquisition of real property for a program or project undertaken by an agency will result in the displacement of any person after the
effective date of this act, the agency shall provide a relocation assistance
advisory program for displaced persons which shall offer the services prescribed in this act If the agency determines that any person occupying property immediately adjacent to the real property acquired is caused substantial
economic injury because of the acquisition, it may offer this person relocation
advisory services under such program
(2) Each relocation assistance program required by Subsection (1) shall
include such measures, facilities, or services as may be necessary or appropn
ate in order

57-12-10. Displacing agency may contract for services or
function through another agency.
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To prevent unnecessary expense and duplication of functions and to pro
mote uniform and effective administration of relocation assistance programs
for displaced persons, the displacing agency may enter into contracts with any
person for services in connection with these programs, or may carry out its
functions under this act through any agency or any federal agency or instrumentality

0/-1Z-J.1
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History: L. 1972, ch. 24, ~§ 10.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 57-12-1.

57-12-11.

Payments not income or resources for welfare or
tax purposes.

No payment received by a displaced person under this act shall be considered as income or resources for the purpose of determining the eligibility or
extent of eligibility of any person for assistance under any state law or for the
purposes of the state's individual income tax, corporation franchise tax, or
other tax laws. These payments shall not be considered as income or resources
of any recipient of public assistance, and such payments shall not be deducted
from the amount of aid to which the recipient would otherwise be entitled.
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, § 11.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 57-12-1.

57-12-12.

Judicial review.

(1) Any person aggrieved by an order concerning relocation assistance may
obtain judicial review.
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings is in the
district court of the county in which the real property taken for public use is
located.
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, 8 12; 1987, ch.
161, § 194.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective January 1, 1988, substituted
the present provisions for "Any person or busine88 aggrieved by final administrative deter-

57-12-13.

mination concerning relocation assistance authorized by this act may appeal such determination to the district court of the county in
which the real property taken for public use is
located."

Procedure for acquisition of property.

Any agency acquiring real property as to which it has the power to acquire
under the eminent domain or condemnation laws of this state shall comply
with the following policies:
(1) Every reasonable effort shall be made to acquire expeditiously real
property i^JiegotiaiioxL
(2) Real property shall be appraised before the initiation of negotiations, and the owner or his designated representative shall be given an
opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the property.
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, an amount
shall be established which is reasonably believed to be just compensation
therefor, and such amount shall be offered for the property. In no event
shall such amount be less than the lowest approved appraisal of the fair
market value of the property. Any decrease or increase of the fair market
value of real property prior to the date of valuation caused by the public
improvement for which such property is acquired or by the likelihood that
the property would be acquired for such improvement, other than that
426
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due to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the owner,
will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the property.
The owner of the real property to be acquired shall be provided with a
written statement of, and summary of the basis for, the amount established as just compensation. Where appropriate the just compensation for
real property acquired and for damages to remaining real property shall
be separately stated.
(4) No owner shall be required to surrender possession of real property
acquired through federal or federally assisted programs before the agreed
purchase price is paid or there is deposited with a court having jurisdiction of condemnation of such property, in accordance with applicable law,
for the benefit of the owner an amount not less than the lowest approved
appraisal of the fair market value of such property or the amount of the
award of compensation in the condemnation proceeding of such property.
(5) The construction or development of a public improvement shall be
so scheduled that, to the greatest extent practicable, no person lawfully
occupying real property shall be required to move from a dwelling (assuming a replacement dwelling will be available) or to move his business
or farm operation without at least ninety days' written notice from the
date by which such move is required.
(6) If an owner or tenant is permitted to occupy the real property acquired on a rental basis for a short term or for a period subject to termination on short notice, the amount of rent required shall not exceed the fair
rental value of the property to a short-term occupier.
(7) In no event shall the time of condemnation be advanced, on negotiations or condemnation and the deposit of funds in court for the use of the
owner be deferred, or any other coercive action be taken to compel an
agreement on the price to be paid for the property.
(8) If an interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the
power of eminent domain, formal condemnation proceedings shall be instituted. The acquiring agency shall not intentionally make it necessary
for an owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking
of his real property.
(9) If the acquisition of only part of the property would leave its owner
with an uneconomic remnant, an offer to acquire the entire property shall
be made.
History: L. 1972, ch. 24, § 13.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
'air market value.
In condemnation proceedings any enhancement or decrease in value attributable to the
urpose for which the property is being con-

demned shall be excluded in determining the
fair market value of the property. Redevelopment Agency v. Grutter, 734 P.2d 434 (Utah
1986).
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4630.

CHAPTER 61. UNIFORM RELOCATION ASSISTANCE AND
REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION POLICIES FOR FEDERAL
AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS

4631.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

4632.

Section
4601.
Definitions
4602. Effect upon property acquisition
4603. Additional appropriations for moving costs, relocation benefits and
other expenses incurred in acquisition of lands for National Park
System; waiver of benefits.
4604. Certification
(a) Acceptance of State agency certification
(b) Promulgation of regulations; monitoring and report to Congress
on implementation by State agency; availability of information;
notice and comment; consultation with local governments
(c) Effect of noncompliance with certification or with applicable law

4633.

UNIFORM RELOCATION ASSISTANCE
Declaration of findings and policy
(a) Findings
(b) Policy
(c) Congressional intent
4622. Moving and related expenses
(a) General provision
(b) Displacement from dwelling; election of payments; moving expenses and dislocation allowance
(c) Displacement from business or farm operation; election of payments; minimum and maximum amounts; eligibility
(d) Certain utility relocation expenses.
4623. Replacement housing for homeowner; mortgage insurance
4624. Replacement housing for tenants and certain others
4625. Relocation planning, assistance coordination, and advisory services
(a) Planning of programs or projects undertaken by Federal agencies
or with Federal financial assistance
(b) Availability of advisory services
n(cj Measures, facilities, or services; description
(d) Coordination of relocation activities with other Federal, State, or
local governmental actions
(e) Selection of implementation procedures
(0 Tenants occupying property acquired for programs or projects;
eligibility for advisory services
4626. Housing replacement by Federal agency as last resort
4627. State required to furnish real property incident to Federal assistance
(local cooperation)
4628. State acting as agent for Federal program
4629. Public works programs and projects of District of Columbia government and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
54
4621.

4634.
4635.
4636.
4637.

Requirements for relocation payments and assistance of Federally
assisted program; assurances of availability of housing
Federal share of costs
(a) Cost to displacing agency; eligibility
(b) Comparable payments under other laws
(c) Agreements prior to January 2, 1971; advancements
Administration; relocation assistance in programs receiving Federal
financial assistance
Duties of lead agency
(a) General provisions
(b) Regulations and procedures
(c) Applicability to Tennessee Valley Authority
[Repealed]
Planning and other preliminary expenses for additional housing
Payments not to be considered as income for revenue purposes or for
eligibility for assistance under Social Security Act or other Federal
law
[Repealed]

4638. Transfers of surplus property
UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION POLICY
4651.
4652.
4653.
4654.

Uniform policy on real property acquisition practices
Buildings, structures, and improvements
Expenses incidental to transfer of title to United States
Litigation expenses
(a) Judgment for owner or abandonment of proceedings
(b) Payment
(c) Claims against the United States
4655. Requirements for uniform land acquisition policies; payments of
expenses incidental to transfer of real property to State; payment of
litigation expenses in certain cases

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Watershed projects under the Soil Conservation Service, 7 CFR Part 622.
Construction and maintenance, Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR
Part 635.
Right of way, general, Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR Part 710.
Relocation assistance, Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR Part 740.
T^ederal assistanceTO persons drsplaced^froin^thcir^^
farms by governmental acquisition of real property, Secretary of Labor, 29
CFR Part 12.
Relocation assistance and land acquisition under the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 36 CFR Part
904.
CROSS REFERENCES
This chapter is referred to in 23 USCS § 117; 25 USCS § 640d-14; 40 USCS
§§616, 875, 877; 42 USCS §§ 5181, 11503; 43 USCS § 1578; 49 USCS Appx
§§ 1604, 2208.
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42 U S C S § 4638
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Junkyard control and acquisition under the Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR Part 751.
RESEARCH GUIDE
Forms:
10A Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Housing and Urban Development
§ 39:72.
Annotations:
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970 (42 USCS §§ 4601-4655). 33 ALR Fed 9.
Law Review Articles:
Lucke, Relocation Assistance Advisory Programs: A Need for Early
Judicial Review. 27 Administrative L Rev 17.
The Uniform Relocation Act: A Viable Solution to the Plight of the
Displaced. 25 Catholic U L Rev 552.
Roberts, Homes, Road Builders and the Courts: Highway Relocation
and Judicial Review of Administrative Action. 46 So Cal L Rev 51.
Leary & Turner, The Injustice of "Just Compensation*' to Fixed
Income Recipients—Does Recent Relocation Legislation Fill the Void?
48 Temple LQ 1.
Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief. 57 Va L Rev
745.
In the Path of Progress: Federal Highway Relocation Assurances. 82
Yale L J 373.
UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION POLICY
§ 4651. Uniform policy on real property acquisition practices
In order to encourage and expedite the acquisition of real property by
agreements with owners, to avoid litigation and relieve congestion in the
courts, to assure consistent treatment for owners in the many Federal
programs, and to promote public confidence in Federal land acquisition
practices, heads of Federal agencies shall, to the greatest extent practicable,
be guided by the following policies:
(TJThe head of a Federal agency shall make^very^reasonable effort to
acquire expeditiously real property by negotiation.
(2) Real property shall be appraised before the initiation of negotiations,
and the owner or his designated representatives shall be given an
opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the
property, except that the head of the lead agency may prescribe a
procedure to waive the appraisal in cases involving the acquisition by
sale or donation of property with a low fair market value.
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, the head of the
Federal agency concerned shall establish an amount which he believes to
be just compensation therefor and shall make a prompt offer to acquire
120
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the property for the full amount so established. In no event shall such
amount be less than the agency's approved appraisal of the fair market
value of such property. Any decrease or increase in the fair market
value of real property prior to the date of valuation caused by the public
improvement for which such property is acquired, or by the likelihood
that the property would be acquired for such improvement, other than
that due to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the
owner, will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the
property. The head of the Federal agency concerned shall provide the
owner of real property to be acquired with a written statement of, and
summary of the basis for, the amount he established as just compensation. Where appropriate the just compensation for the real property
acquired and for damages to remaining real property shall be separately
stated.
(4) No owner shall be required to surrender possession of real property
before the head of the Federal agency concerned pays the agreed
purchase price, or deposits with the court in accordance with section 1
of the Act of February 26, 1931 (46 Stat. 1421; 40 U.S.C. 258a), for the
benefit of the owner, an amount not less than the agency's approved
appraisal of the fair market value of such property, or the amount of the
award of compensation in the condemnation proceeding for such property.
(5) The construction or development of a public improvement shall be
so scheduled that, to the greatest extent practicable, no person lawfully
occupying real property shall be required to move from a dwelling
(assuming a replacement dwelling as required by title II will be available), or to move his business or farm operation, without at least ninety
days* written notice from the head of the Federal agency concerned, of
the date by which such move is required.
(6) If the head of a Federal agency permits an owner or tenant to
occupy the real property acquired on a rental basis for a short term or
for a period subject to termination by the Government on short notice,
the amount of rent required shall not exceed the fair rental value of the
property to a short-term occupier.
(7) In no event shall the head of a Federal agency either advance the
time of condemnation, or defer negotiations or condemnation and the
deposit of funds in court fornthenise of the owner, or^ta^e^any^other
action coercive in nature, in order to compel an agreement on the price
to be paid for the property.
(8) If any interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the
power of eminent domain, the head of the Federal agency concerned
shall institute formal condemnation proceedings. No Federal agency
head shall intentionally make it necessary for an owner to institute legal
proceedings to prove the fact of the taking of his real property.
(9) If the acquisition of only a portion of a property would leave the
owner with an uneconomic remnant, the head of the Federal agency
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concerned shall offer to acquire that remnant For the purposes of thi*
Act, an uneconomic remnant is a parcel of real property in which th<
owner is left with an interest after the partial acquisition of the owner'?
property and which the head of the Federal agency concerned has
determined has little or no value or utility to the owner
(10) A person whose real property is being acquired m accordance with
this title may, after the person has been fully informed of his nght tc
receive just compensation for such property, donate such property, and
part thereof, any interest therein, or any compensation paid therefor to a
Federal agency, as such person shall determine
(Jan 2, 1971, P L 91-646, Title III, § 301, 84 Stat 1904, Apr 2, 1987, P
L. 100-17, Title IV, § 4 1 6 , 101 Stat 2 5 5 )
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
References in text:
"Title II", referred to in this section, is Title II of Act Jan 2, 1971, P
L 91-646, 84 Stat 1895, which appears generally as 42 USCS §§4621
et seq For full classification of such Title, consult USCS Tables
volumes
"This Act**, referred to in this section, is Act Jan 2, 1971, P L 91646, 84 Stat 1894, which appears generally as 42 USCS §§ 4601 et seq
For full classification of such Act, consult USCS Tables volumes
"This title**, referred to in this section, is Title III of Act 91-646, 84
Stat 1904, which appears generally as 42 USCS §§ 4651 et seq For full
classification of such Act, consult USCS Tables volumes
Effective date of section:
Act Jan 2, 1971, P L 91-646, Title II, § 221(a), 84 Stat 1904, which
appears as 42 USCS § 4601 note, provided that this section shall take
effect on the date of its enactment on Jan 2, 1971
Amendments:
1987. Act Apr 2, 1987, in para (2), inserted ", except that the head of
the lead agency may prescribe a procedure to waive the appraisal in
cases involving the acquisition by sale or donation of property with a
low fair market value**, substituted para (9) for one which read "If the
acquisition of only part of a property would leave its owner with an
uneconomic remnant, the head of the Federal agency concerned shall
offer to acquire the entire property ", and added para (10)
Other provisions:
^Savtegs^rovisieiii^Ac^^^
Stat 1907, provided in part "Any nghts or liabilities now existing
under prior Acts or portions thereof shall not be affected by the repeal
of such prior Act or portions thereof under this section [repealing 23
USCS § 141, 33 USCS § 596 and 42 USCS §§ 3071-3073 and addmg
this note] '*
Effective date and application of Act Jan. 2, 1971. Act Jan 2, 1971, P
L 91-646, Title II, § 221(c), 84 Stat 1904, which appears as 42 USCS
§ 4601 note, provided that the repeals made by § 306 of such Act [42
122

USCS § 4651 notej are enecuve on mc uoiw ^. *,.
1971, except that such repeals are not applicable to any State so long as
42 USCS §§ 4630 and 4655 are not applicable to such State Until July
1, 1972, such sections are applicable only to the extent that such State
is able under its laws to comply with 42 USCS §§ 4630 and 4655, and
after July 1, 1972, such sections are completely applicable to all States
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Acquisition of real property under federally assisted programs, 7 CFR Part
651
Title VI program and related statutes implementation and review procedures
under the Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR Part 200
The acquisition function of the Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR
Part 712
Right-of-way—the property management function under the Federal Highl
way Administration, 23 CFR Part 713
Junkyard control and acquisition under the Federal Highway Administration, 23 CFR Part 751
Housing and Urban Development provision of replacement housing under
the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970, 24 CFR Part 43
Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation relocation assistance and
land acquisition under Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 36 CFR Part 904
CROSS REFERENCES
This section is referred to in 16 USCS § 698f, 42 USCS §§ 4602, 4655
RESEARCH GUIDE
Federal Procedure L Ed:
7 Fed Proc L Ed, Condemnation of Property §§ 14 1, 29, 71, 82, 105,
119, 121, 156, 192, 255, 258, 307-334
6 Fed Proc L Ed, Civil Rights § 11 8
Am Jur:
27 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 388, 471
Forms:
5 Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Condemnation of Property §§ 13 122,
123, 127, 130
10A Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Housing and Urban Development
j|JJ972_^
Annotations:
Supreme Court's views as to what constitutes "taking," within meaning
of Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking of pnvate property for
public use without just compensation 89 L Ed 2d 977
Measure of damages payable on condemnation of real property by
Federal Government-Supreme Court cases 60 L Ed 2d 1107
Evidence involving compromise or offer of compromise as inadmissible
under Rule 408 of Federal Rules of Evidence 72 ALR Fed 592
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Evan A. Schmutz (USB #3860)
Robert A. Goodman (USB #4580)
JONES # WALDO/ HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for DEFENDANT
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
TELEPHONE:
(801) 521-3200
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF TOOELE COUNTY,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSI^ M C ^ p LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH WILEY FERREBEE,
Trustee of the Ferrebee
1976 Family Trust,

Civil No

CV-86-156

Judge Hornler F. Wilkinson
Defendant.

The above-entitled
Honorable

Homer

matter came on for trial before the

F. Wilkinson

on July

and concluded on August 29, 1989.

11 through July 14, 1989,

The plaint [iff, Board of County

Commissioners of Tooele County (the "County")
David

B.

Thomas;

("Ferrebee"),
Goodman.

was

the

defendant,

represented

by Evan

Joseph
A.

was represented by
Wiley

Sclhmutz and

Ferrebee
Robert

A.

The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and

having received the evidence, rendered its bqnch ruling on August
29,

1989,

proposed

at

the

conclusion

of

the

trial.

After

hearings

on

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law held on January

24 and March 15, 1990, the Court now makes tqe following Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

tiOQ 4 1 3

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In

the

1970's,

the

County

devised

a

plan

to

construct the Tooele County Airport near Erda \ Utah.
2.

At the time the County planned construction of the

Tooele County Airport/ Ferrebee owned eighty [(80) acres of ground
in the area of the planned airport.
3.
airport

The County's original Airport layouts Plan for the

included

approximately

sixty-eight

Ferrebee's eighty (80) acre parcel.
the Ferrebee

acres were not

(68)

acres

of

Approximately twelve (12) of

included

in t!(ie County's original

plan.
4.

On May 16, 1986, after the ini tial construction of

the airport, the County filed this action td condemn the remaining forty-three (43) acres of the Ferrebee property (the "Subject
Property").
5.

The 1986 condemnation was a cpmplete and separate

action from the 1975 condemnation.

Federal

6.

With

and

State

respect

to -tho

Relocation

Acts,

1986
the

c pndomnation—and-

the

County

act

failed

to

expeditiously to acquire the Subject Property by negotiation
7.

With respect to the provision p of the Federal and

State Relocation Acts, the County failed to notify Ferrebee that
it was having the Subject Property appraise^, and failed to give
Ferrebee or his representatives an opportunity to accompany the
County's
Property.

appraisers

during

their

inspection

of

the

Subject

8.

With respect to the provisions of the Federal and

State Relocation Acts, the County failed to offer to Ferrebee the
lowest appraisal amount for purchase of the property.
9.
State

With respect to the provisions! of the Federal and

Relocation

Acts,

the

County

failed

to

make

a

full

disclosure to Ferrebee of information which was the basis for the
amount used by the County in negotiations wifn Ferrebee.
10.

The

comparable

sales

used

by

the

County's

appraisers, and particularly the Terracor sa[Les, were not competent adjusted comparables.
11.

The Terracor sales used by the County1s appraisers

involved depressed sales arising out of circumstances under which
Terracor was trying to get rid of its land| by dumping a large
amount

of land on the market.

constituting

the

Terracor

Consequent! y, the transactions

sales

are

not

competent

comparable

sales.
12.

The appraisal of Phil Cook, Flerrebee's appraiser,

is the best estimate

of the

fair market

value of the Subject

Property, and is adopted by the Court as the true market value of
the Subject Property.
13.

As set

forth in the Cook appijraisal, the agricul-

tural value of the Subject Property was $52,d)00 on May 16, 1986.
14.

Ferrebee had a verbal option with Floyd Walters to

^ >^acquire access to the Subject Property for $500 per acre.
15.
access

Ferrebee

entered

into a written option to acquire

to the Subject Property at a stated value of $5,000 per
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uOO

acre.

The Court finds that this $5,000 per ac^re value for access

to the Subject Property was binding on Ferrepee and, based upon
such value, adopts a total cost to acquire access of $19,240.
16.

As indicated in the Cook appraisal, the fair market

value of the property is enhanced by its proximity to the initial
construction of the airport.
17.

As set forth in the Cook appraisal, the fair market

value of the property is the base agricultural value of the land
($52,000), less the cost of access (determined by the Court to be
$19,240), plus an enhancement of $40,950 or 125 percent of the
adjusted agricultural base value for the property's proximity to
the airport, based upon competent comparable sales of land adjacent to other rural airports, for a total 4 a i r market value of
$74,000.
18.

Ferrebee paid taxes on the Subject Property in the

amount of $826.31 after the County took posset«sion of the Subject
Property.
19.

The

County

deposited

with

th^ Court

the sum of

$9,004.87 at about the time of condemnation.
20.

Ferrebee expended reasonable an|d necessary costs in

this action in the amount of $307.32.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code Sec.

57-12-1, et. seq. does not apply to this case.
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2.

The

Uniform

Relocation

Assistance

and

Land

Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4601, et. seq.
does not apply to this case.
3.
value

of

Ferrebee

the

Subject

is entitled
Property,

to be paid

as

the fair market

discountted by the cost of

access and as enhanced by its proximity to thkle airport.

The fair

market value thus calculated is $74,000.
4.
the

Subject

Ferrebee
Property

is entitled to a refund of taxes paid on
after

the County

took possession

in the

amount of $826.31.
5.

Ferrebee

is

entitled

to

his

reasonable

and

necessary costs in the amount of $307.32.
6.
entitled
percent

Pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Sec. 78-34-9, Ferrebee

is

to interest on the sum of $64,995.13 at the rate of 8
per

annum

from May 16, 1986 to the date of entry of

Judgment.
7.

Ferrebee is entitled to interest at the rate of 12

percent per annum on the total amount of Judgment from the date
of entry of Judgment thereafter.
DATED this <?&

day of April, 199(0.
BY THE COURT:

Homer F. Wilkinson
District Judge
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HOLMB ROBERTS & OWEN
Evan A. Schmutz (#3860)
50 South Main, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 521-5800
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF TOOELE COUNTY,
JrUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs
Civil No. CV-86156

JOSEPH WILEY FERREBEE,
Trustee of the Ferrebee
197 6 Family Trust,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.
The

above

entitled

matter

came on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, sitting without a jury, on July 11
through July 14, 1989, and concluded on August 29, 1989.

The

plaintiff, Board of County Commissioners of Tooele County (the
"County"), was represented
Joseph Wiley Ferrebee
Schmutz

and

by David B. Thomas; the defendant,

("Ferrebee"), was represented by Evan A.

Robert A. Goodman.

The Court, having

heard

the

arguments of counsel, and having received the evidence, rendered
its bench ruling at the conclusion of trial, on August 29, 1989,
and following several hearings, entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on April 30, 1990.

Beipg fully advised in the

premises and good cause appearing thereforj,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant
Joseph Wiley Ferrebee shall have judgment against plaintiff Board

iififl-i i ft

of County Commissioners of Tooele County a& follows:
1.

For the fair market value of t*<* Subject Property in

the amount of $74,000;
2.

For a refund of taxes paid on dhe Subject Property in

the amount of $826.31;
3.

For necessary costs in the amount of $307.32;

4.

For interest on the sum of $64,9^5.13 at the rate of 8%

per annum from May 16, 1986 to the date of I the entry of judgment,
and at the rate of 12% from the date of judgment thereafter;
5.

For interest on the sum of $826 .31 at the rate of 10%

per annum from July 1, 1989 until the date of the entry of
judgment and at the rate of 12% per aijnum from the date of
judgment thereafter;
6.

Each

party

shall

bear

their

own

costs

except as

specifically provided for herein, and thei^ own attorneys' fees.
DATED this

/ f

day of June, 1990.
BY THE (tOURT:

l o n o r a b l e Homer F .
' D i s t r i c t Judge

Wilkinson

A p p r o v e d a s t o Form:
STOKER & THOMAS
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